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On Excess Compensation Earned by 
Underwriters in Firm Commitment 
Initial Public Offerings of Common 
Stock: An Empirical Analysis
Daniel P. Klein 
R. Corwin Grube 
O. Maurice Joy
This paper examines compensation for the underwriting activity in firm 
commitment initial public offerings (IPOs) of common stock in the U.S. 
When compensation for origination, management and marketing efforts 
are excluded from total underwriter compensation, we find that the 
portion of the total compensation assigned for the underwriting activity 
itself exceeds theoretical compensation only for issues that sell out very 
quickly. We interpret this finding as empirical evidence supporting the 
incentive for underwriters to underprice IPOs. Finally, we find excess 
compensation to underwriters is positively related to the riskiness of the 
IPO and negatively related to the degree of competition among 
investment bankers and the size of the IPO.
I. INTRODUCTION
Recently, Kunimura and lihara [12] and Bae and Levy [2] have suggested 
that positive excess compensation, on average, is earned by underwriters in 
firm commitment offerings of seasoned stock in the United States.’ The 
purpose of tbis paper is to determine whether, on average, excess 
compensation is also earned by underwriters in firm commitment initial 
public offerings (IPOs) of common stock in tbe U.S. We also identify 
characteristics of issuing firms and underwriters that are associated with 
excess compensation wben it does occur.
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In a firm commitment underwriting, underwriters typically perform 
three activities for the issuing company. These activities include origination 
and management, distribution, and underwriting (or the actual purchase) 
of the issue. When underwriters purchase shares of stock from issuing 
companies in firm commitment offerings, they accept the risk that the shares 
might only be sold at a price below the offer price; and that, for a time, 
unwanted inventory of stock might have to be carried. Furthermore, 
according to the Rules of Fair Practice of the National Association of 
Securities Dealers, offered shares cannot be sold above the offer price before 
the underwriting account is officially closed. Thus, it is important for the 
underwriter to appropriately price the shares in order to minimize the risk 
of a failed offering, yet still earn an appropriate return for the activities 
performed. Smith [24,25] has pointed out that the offering of new shares at 
a fixed offer price is analogous to the sale of a call option to potential 
investors. In this case, the option is sold by the underwriter since it is assumed 
that the underwriter has officially taken possession of the shares at the time 
of the offer. The sale of a call option backed by the possession of shares 
represents a covered call position and is effectively modeled as a put option. 
This is the approach taken here and, thus, borrows from the previous work 
by Smith [24,25].
Following Bae and Levy [2], Kunimura and lihara [12], Smith [23], and 
Marsh [14], the Black-Scholes Option Pricing Model (OPM) is used to 
estimate the theoretical value of the underwriting risk premium. Any 
difference between the actual compensation paid to the underwriter for 
accepting the risk of the underwriting and the theoretical value determined 
by the Black-Scholes OPM is viewed as excess compensation earned by the 
underwriter.^
The paper is important for several reasons. First, no prior work provides 
an estimate of the excess compensation available to underwnriters in firm 
commitment initial public offerings of common stock. This paper fills that 
gap. Second, underwriter compensation is a significant portion of total issue 
costs in IPOs and thereby deserves additional study (see Ritter [21]). Finally, 
as Logue [13], Johnson and Miller [11] and Tinic [26] suggest, new issue 
underpricing and the amount of compensation paid to underwriters may 
be related. Accordingly, the underwriter compensation results obtained here 
may also provide evidence, at least indirectly, on IPO underpricing.
The results of the paper indicate that when the actual portion of the 
total underwriter compensation that is designated for the underwriting 
activity only is compared to the estimated underwriting risk premium as 
based on a 1 day option maturity, underwriters earn significant excess 
compensation. However, the excess compensation turns negative if the 
implied option maturity is longer than 3 days, suggesting that investment
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bankers have an incentive to sell the issue out quickly. Underpricing, then, 
becomes a viable means of ensuring a speedy distribution. The excess 
compensation results of this paper support the findings of Bae and Levy [2] 
for offerings of seasoned securities.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II discusses 
the 0PM  characterization of underwriter risk premium used here. Section 
III presents the data, empirical tests and results. Section IV identifies firm 
and underwriter characteristics associated with excess returns in IPOs. 
Section V contains a summary and the paper’s conclusions.
II. MODEL SPECIFICATION
As mentioned previously, Smith [24,25] recognized that underwriters of firm 
commitment offerings implicitly sell a call option to investors. Investors have 
the right but not the obligation to purchase shares from the underwriter at 
the offer price. Once the underwriter purchases shares from the issuing firm, 
however, the underwriter has an inventory of shares. Hence the call option 
sale represents a covered call option position for the underwriter. The covered 
call option position is routinely modeled as a put option since the short sale 
of a put option and the covered call position are essentially equivalent.^ To 
make reading of the paper consistent, the covered call position will be referred 
to as the put option from this point forward.
Bae and Levy [2] provide a detailed derivation of the put option value 
of underwriting services in firm commitment offerings and show that the 
value of the underwriting contract, U, is
U =  - e 'p  +  { X - B )
where p  represents a put option, X  represents the offer price of the issue, 
and B represents the bid price paid by the underwriter to the issuing 
company. Thus, in this case, (X — B) represents compensation paid to the 
underwriter by the issuing firm, net of underwriting expenses typically 
faced by underwriters in firm commitment offerings. The value of the put 
option premium should reward the underwriter for having accepted the 
risk associated with the transfer of stock from the issuing company. In an 
efficient market, and if underwritings are costless, then the value of U must 
be equal to 0.
Like fungible options traded on an exchange, most of the parameters 
of the put option model are straightforward or can be easily estimated. An 
exception is the maturity of the put. Because we are, in part, dealing with 
the sale of a call option to investors, the maturity of the put option (i.e..
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the valuation of the covered call position) corresponds to the length of time 
the investment banker is exposed to underwriting risk. It appears the legal 
liability of underwriters in an IPO extends for 30 days/ Many IPOs, however, 
are oversubscribed and sell out on the offering date. As a result, it is not clear 
whether an option maturity of 30 days, one day, or some intermediate value 
is appropriate. Kunimura and lihara [12], for example, use eight days as the 
maturity of the put option in their work on seasoned issues of common stock. 
Bae and Levy [2] use maturities ranging from one to five days in their analysis 
of seasoned offerings. Marsh [14] uses a maturity of approximately 25 days 
in his work on valuing underwriting agreements in UK rights issues, since 
the exercise price in a British rights offering is set roughly 25 days before 
the exercise date. Taking the assumptions of previous work into account, 
we employ three different maturities for the put option in our work: 30 days, 
corresponding to the Master Agreement Among Underwriters; 8 days, 
corresponding to the work by Kunimura and lihara [12]; and, 1 day, 
corresponding to the length of time it typically takes a new issue to be fully 
distributed. Other parameter estimates for the put option are described below.
1. Stock Return Variance, VAR(i), is the annualized rate of return 
variance based on stock returns generated over the first 30 trading days;
2. Exercise Price, C{i), equals the offer price;
3. Stock Price,X(z), equals the offer price;
4. Riskless Return, R(J), is the rate of return on U. S. T-Bills with maturity 
equal to that of the put option.
The variance estimate is similar to that used by Ritter [20]. It requires 
data that are not known to the underwriter at the time of the pricing decision; 
however, as he notes, since no trading scheme is being employed, there is 
little harm in using this data to obtain model estimates.^
The maturity of the put option specifies the maturity of the riskless asset 
used to arrive at the option value. In particular, the 30 day T-Bill rate on 
the effective date of the registration statement is selected as the riskless rate 
of interest when option maturity is 30 days. When option maturity is 8 (1) 
days the 8 (1) day T-Bill rate is used.
The offer price is the price at which investors can purchase stock from 
the underwriter and so corresponds to the exercise price of the put option. 
Likewise, the offer price is the first market price of the stock and is closest 
in time to the effective date of the registration statement. As a result, offer 
price is used as an estimate of both the current market price of the stock and 
the exercise price of the put.
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III. DATA, EMPIRICAL TESTS, AND RESULTS
The SEC’s Registrations and Offerings Statistics (ROS) File is used to 
identify the population of non-Regulation A IPO s/ The 1987 version of the 
ROS File covers the period 1973-1987 and identifies approximately 2800 such 
offerings.’ Our sample period is limited to 1977-1987 since data on the ROS 
File (and other sources) are incomplete prior to 1977.* The 1977-1987 period 
contains 2658 or approximately 95% of the IPOs that appear on the ROS 
File between 1973 and 1987. Between 1977-87 there were 1250 IPOs that were 
issued that included warrants issued to the underwriter. Of the remaining 
issues 139 were part of a unit offering that included other securities. The 
value of the warrant provision is difficult to estimate and, in addition, may 
affect the size of actual underwriter compensation paid by the issuing firm.^ 
As a result, these offerings are excluded from the sample. Similarly, the 
amount of underwriter compensation due solely to the stock transaction in 
unit offerings is ambiguous and these firms are also excluded from the 
sample. After eliminating the above firms as well as the offerings of financial 
institutions, a total of 1130 IPOs were available between 1977-87. From this 
total of 1130 available firms, a random sample of 209 firms was selected for 
study here. A sampling procedure was necessary since nearly all IPOs initially 
trade in the OTC market and data collection was costly.
Summzu'y values for selected variables by year are shown in Table 1. 
For the sample, the gross spread ranged from as little as 4% to over 10% and 
averaged 7.41% over the 11 year period. The gross spread was negatively 
correlated with issue size: the spread to underwriters for the quartile of largest 
IPOs averaged 6.64% and for the quartile of smallest IPOs 8.37%. These results 
are consistent with those reported by Mendelson [15] for larger IPOs during 
the 1945-1963 period and Ritter [21] for larger IPOs during the 1977-82 
period. The average gross spread results for the random sample used here 
are also consistent with the full sample results as provided by Aggarwal and 
Rivoli [1]. Aggarwal and Rivoli, studying firm commitment IPOs over the 
same time frame, and for a sample of 1556 firms, found the average gross 
underwriter spread to be 8.24%. Thus, the gross spread results of the sample 
used here are reasonably representative of the full sample. The average offer 
price of $13.00 per share is similar to that reported by Miller and Reilly [17] 
who found common stock IPOs averaged $11.13 per share during the 1982- 
83 period. The average issue size of $26.2 million exceeds the $17.4 million 
reported by Carter and Manaster [6]. This disparity in issue size is caused 
primarily by our 1987 data.** Excluding 1987 data, the average issue size for 
our sample is $19.4 million, comparable to the Carter and Manaster study. 
Finally, the average first day (offering day) return of 7.64% is a measure of 
issue underpricing and is similar to the 9.87% reported by Miller and Reilly
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[17]. A test of the pooled mean of 7.64% against zero permits rejection of the 
null hypothesis of zero at the 95% confidence level (f=6.10). Thus our sample 
exhibits the significant underpricing phenomenon reported in prior IPO 
work. Relative to other IPO studies, our sample contains somewhat larger 
issues but with other firm characteristics comparable to those found in prior 
work.
Panel A of Table 2 presents the excess return results from employing 
the Black-Scholes OPM to estimate the theoretical underwriter risk premium 
as a put option.'^ The results in Panel A also assume that underwriting 
expenses are zero. That is, the entire spread, (X — B), represents payment 
made to the underwriter for taking on risk. Thus, excess compensation is 
measured for each IPO as the difference between the actual gross spread and 
the estimated risk premium. These values are then aggregrated cross 
sectionally. Excess compensation results are shown for option values with 
30, eight, and one day maturities, respectively. The cross-sectional variance 
of these differences is estimated to perform a t-test of the paired difference 
sample mean. For the 30 day maturity, the results show, on average, actual 
compensation for risk exceeds estimated compensation by 0.96% (i=5.55). 
When the maturity of the put option is reduced to eight days to provide results 
comparable to Kunimura and lihara [12], average excess compensation 
increases to 4.37% (t=42.8). When maturity is specified at one day, average 
excess compensation is 6.40% (t=94.7).
The Panel A results reported above assume that the gross spread 
represents the fee paid by the issuing company for the underwriting activity. 
As noted previously, underwriters originate, manage and distribute an IPO 
in addition to underwriting the issue. A review of the Investment Dealers 
Digest shows that between 10% and 30% of the gross spread is typically 
specified for the underwriting activity — the remainder is compensation for 
origination, management and distribution efforts. Since the fee for 
underwriting activity is the portion of the gross spread charged by the 
investment banker for risk taking, it may be more appropriate to compare 
the estimated risk premium to the underwriting activity fee. It is assumed 
that the underwriter receives just enough compensation to cover the costs 
associated with management and distribution of the issue. The underwriting 
activity portion of the gross spread was collected for each offering through 
information from the Investment Dealers Digest. When actual underwriter 
compensation for only the underwriting activity is considered, a quite 
different set of results occurs. These results are shown in Panel B of Table
2. Here excess compensation is negative (and significant) for put option 
maturities of 30 and eight days but positive and significant for the one day 
maturity. Assuming the Investment Dealer Digest breakdown of fees is 
appropriate for each issue, these results suggest positive excess compensation
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Table 1
Summary Statistics by Year for IPOs 
Issued Between 1977 and 1987
Year # Sample Firms
Average Gross 
Spread^
Average Annual Std. 
Dev. of Returns
1977 6 7.83% 50.11%
1978 11 7.61% 68.88%
1979 19 7.82% 63.36%
1980 12 7.60% 76.42%
1981 22 7.64% 66.81%
1982 11 7.26% 53.32%
1983 44 7.12% 53.36%
1984 17 7.66% 41.86%
1985 18 7.28% 52.50%
1986 34 7.27% 53.22%
1987 15 7.31% 53.22%
All 209 7.41% 50.94%
Average Average First Average Issue Size
Year Offer Price Day Return'" {in Millions)
1977 $10.46 4.91% 1 6.51
1978 15.48 11.41% 9.94
1979 12.99 8.26% 8.87
1980 17.38 18.22% 19.10
1981 12.86 3.75% 12.48
1982 14.00 3.44% 18.85
1983 14.55 7.19% 25.73
1984 9.58 1.71% 20.98
1985 12.21 6.99% 23.98
1986 13.00 11.08% 23.95
1987 11.28 6.46% 114.76
All $13.00 7.64% $ 26.24
Notes: “ As a percent of Offer Price
(Closing Bid Price - Offer Price)/Offer Price
for underwriters occurs only in IPOs that sell out quickly. For IPOs that 
do not sell quickly, underwriters experience economic losses i.e., negative 
excess compensation, associated with their underwriting activities.
These results provide strong empirical evidence on the incentive for 
underwriters to sell out IPOs quickly and, hence, avoid economic losses on 
their underwriting activities. They also provide strong evidence on the 
incentive for underwriters to underprice new issues. Underpricing is the most 
direct way to create excess demand for new shares and to ensure they sell 
quickly. Accordingly, our results could also be interpreted as empirical 
evidence on the incentive for underwriters to underprice IPOs: absent
Table 2
Excess Compensation Earned by Underwriters in IPOs: 1977-87
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Put Option Maturity Excess Return t-value
Panel A: Gross Spread^
30 Days 0.96% 5.55
8 Days 4.37% 42.81
1 Day 6.40% 94.73
Panel B: Compensation for Underwriting Services Only
30 Days -4.82% 29.29
8 Days -1.41% 16.95
IDay 0.62% 18.64
Note: “ (Offer Price - Net Offer Price)/Offer Price
underpricing, underwriters are exposed to substantial risks of economic 
losses associated with underwriting activity.
Finally, although put option value is not a linear function of time and 
as a result, excess compensation results are not a linear function of time, 
a linear approximation is useful for small changes in option maturity. Using 
this approximation, we note that excess compensation averages zero at about 
2.8 days. This suggests, on average, shares that sell in less than three days 
provide underwriters with positive excess compensation; shares that require 
more than three days provide underwriters negative excess compensation.'^ 
Whether any particular IPO provides positive or negative excess 
compensation for underwriters depends upon the weighted average length 
of time required to sell shares. For example, if 90% of an issue is sold on 
the first day of the offering and 10% is sold on the 20th day, the weighted 
average length of time required to sell shares would be three days and the 
underwriter would earn approximately zero excess compensation on the 
entire issue.
Since the underwriting portion represents, on average, 22% of the total 
underwriter compensation for this sample, the 0.62% average excess 
compensation for a 1 day option maturity represents 38% of the average 
payment made by the issuing company for the underwriting activity and 8.4 
% of the sample average gross spread. These are, by no means, small 
percentages; especially if the great majority of issues sell out on the first day 
of the offer. Consequently, for these quick selling issues, the proportionately 
large amount of excess compensation relative to the payment for the 
underwriting activity suggests the capture of quasi-rents by underwriters. 
Thus, the results support the idea of the payment of reputational capital 
as suggested by Beatty and Ritter [4], Booth and Smith [5], and Carter and
Manaster [6], among others. However, one cannot exclude the possibility that 
the capture of these quasi-rents makes up for losses associated with slow 
moving issues. As noted before, the excess compensation associated with the 
underwriting activity disappears within 3 days. If the cost of holding 
inventory is also added on, underwriters would realize zero returns sooner 
than 3 days post-offer.
IV. FIRM, MARKET AND UNDERWRITER 
CHARACTERISTICS AND EXCESS COMPENSATION
We next perform a cross-sectional analysis to identify firm, market, and 
underwriter characteristics associated with excess compensation. We employ 
a multiple regression model for this purpose where the selection of 
independent variables for the regression equation follows prior work. We 
also include a (0,1) dummy variable for Hot/Cold new issue markets based 
upon work by Ibbotson [9], Ibbotson and Jaffe [10], and Ritter [20].
The independent variables are:
VAR(?) =  annualized rate of return variance based on stock returns 
generated over the first 30 trading days (in natural log form);
ISS(j) =  dollar value of shares offered for sale for security i (in natural 
log form);
COMP(i) =  underwriter competition measured as a (0,1) dummy variable 
indicating the presence or absence of a leading investment 
banking firm in the offering;
H{i) =  a 0,1 dummy variable indicating a hot or cold new issue 
market.
VAR(i) is used as a proxy for firm risk. Ritter [20] points out that a 
measure of volatility is a plausible measure of firm risk since firms with 
greater aftermarket volatility are also firms with greater pre-offer uncertainty 
associated with their market value. ISS(?) is a proxy for both firm size and 
economies of scale associated with underwritings (see, for example, Logue
[13] and Hansen, Fuller and Janjigian [8]). Larger firms are expected to float 
larger issues and should be better known to the investing public. Larger issues 
also represent greater dollars over which underwriters can spread their fixed 
costs.
COMP(z) represents a measure of underwriter competition, where 
COMP(z) =  1 if a national underwriter is the managing underwriter, 0 
otherwise. The logic behind COMP(i) is that an issuer who has been able 
to attract a national underwriter as the managing underwriter has, therefore,
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been able to establish a more competitive environment for the underwriting 
relative to the environment that would exist if a small regional underwriter 
were managing the issue. The national/regional classification of an 
underwriter is provided by various Securities Industry yearbooks (also, see 
Pugel and White [19]).
Finally, HOT(i) refers to a hot or cold issue market and attempts to 
account for the market environment into which the IPO will be sold. A hot 
issue, according to Ibbotson and Jaffe [10], refers to a specific IPO that has 
risen above its offering price by a greater than average premia in the 
aftermarket. A hot issue market occurs when many such stocks are issued 
in a specific time period. In terms of the time period for this study, previous 
research by Ritter [20] and Muscarella and Vetsuypens [18] has identified the 
time periods of 1980 through the first quarter of 1981 as well as 1983 as hot 
issue markets. HOT(?) =  1 for a stock issued in a hot issue market, 0 otherwise.
The independent variables used in the regression model represent a 
relatively short list. However, as based on the results from previous work, 
some of which has been noted, they represent those variables that, in one 
measure or another, have been expected to exert an influence on variables 
such as underwriter compensation.^*
Before examining excess compensation, we first perform the regressions 
using actual gross spread as the dependent variable. This allows us to 
compare our results directly with prior work on underv^iter compensadon 
in offerings of seasoned common stock. We expect a positive sign for the 
coefficient on return variance; a negative sign for issue size; a negative sign 
for underwriter competition; and a negative sign for Hot/Cold markets 
indicating increased underwriter compensation in Hot Issue markets. These 
results are shown as regressions 1 and 2 in Table 3.
Regression 1 shows that gross spread is positively related to the riskiness 
of the issue, VAR(«); and negatively related to both the size of the issue, ISS(?‘), 
and the degree of competition among underwriters COMP(i). There is little 
association between gross spread and the market environment as measured 
by the 0,1 dummy variable for Hot/Cold new issue markets. These results 
are as expected and are similar to those reported elsewhere for new issues 
of seasoned securities. When we focus on only the underwriting portion of 
actual gross spread in Equation 2, we obtain similar results.
Next we examine the relationship between excess compensation earned 
by underwriters and issue riskiness, investment banker competition, market 
environment and firm size. We expect signs on the regression coefficients 
to be as above with the exception of return variance, VAR(?). For VAR(0 
we expect a negative sign with the logic being that greater return volatihty 
means a greater chance that the investment banker will have to sell the issue 
below the offer price, thus reducing excess compensation. We report results
62 JOURNAL OF SMALL BUSINESS FINANCE 2(1)1992
On Excess Compensation 63
Table 3
Underwriter Compensation in IPOs Regressed 
Against Market, Firm and Underwriter Variables^
# V A R (it ISS(i) COMP(i) H(i) F R'
r 0.0078 -0.0985 -0.0195 -0.0056 91.85 0.636
(1.35) (15.03)* (1.63) (0.50)
2 0.0299 -0.0880 -0.0571 -0.0269 18.6 0.258
(2.14)* (5.60)* (1.98)* (0.99)
3 -0.0038 -0.0071 -0.0018 -0.0006 74.03 0.0637
(7.79)* (13.31)* 1.87) (0.66)
4 -0.0039 -0.0013 -0.0010 0.0009 81.68 0.608
(16.16)* (4.94)* (1.98)* (1.86)
5 -0.0072 -0.0019 -0.0004 78.02 0.526
(11.78)* (1.68) (0.34)
6 -0.0014 -0.0010 -0.0006 9.62 0.111
(3.44)* (1.38) (0.85)
Notes:  ^Parentheses show t statistics.
 ^VAR(i) and ISS(i) are in natural log form.
Dependent variables are actual gross spread and actual underwriter compensation for 
underwriting services only for regressions 1 and 2, respectively; excess compensation based upon 
actual gross spread for regressions 3 and 5; and, excess compensation based upon underwriter 
compensation for underwriting services only in regressions 4 and 6.
VAR(i) =  annualized rate of return variance based on stock returns generated over the first 
30 trading days;
ISS(i) =  dollar value of shares offered forsale for security i;
COMP(i) =  underwriter competition measured as a (0,1) dummy variable indicating the 
presence or absence of a leading investment banking firm in the offering;
H(i) =  a (0,1) dummy variable indicating a hot or cold new issue market.
* Significant at the 0.05 level of significance.
for excess compensation using a one day put option maturity since excess 
compensation based upon other option maturities provides similar results. 
Regression 3 uses excess compensation generated by assuming that the gross 
spread represents payment for underwriting risk. Regression 4 uses excess 
compensation based upon only the underwriting portion of total 
compensation, net of fees paid for management and distribution. The results 
of both regressions are similar. Excess compensation is strongly negatively 
related to issue riskiness, issue size and competition among underwriters and 
to a lesser degree, market environment.
Although the negative coefficient on return variance is not surprising, 
there are other possible explanations for this finding. First, it may be that 
we have systematically mis-estimated IPO return variance, i.e., measurement 
error exists. If so, our variance estimates of high risk stocks are too large
and our variance estimates of low risk stocks are too small. This would 
contribute to the negative coefficient on return variance in Regressions 3 and
4. To correct for this possible bias, each firm’s return variance is adjusted 
using a Bayesian approach similar to that used by Vasicek [27] and Marsh
[14].*’ When Regressions 3 and 4 are reestimated using Bayesian adjusted 
variances, the results (not shown) are virtually unchanged and suggest that 
measurement error in the return variance estimate is not responsible for these 
findings. A second possibility we consider is the limit on underwriter 
compensation in IPOs proposed by the National Association of Security 
Dealers (NASD). NASD suggests that underwriter compensation in excess 
of 14% should be justified by the underwriting syndicate.** This restriction, 
if operative, could cause underwriters to limit their compensation to 14% or 
less and thereby earn low or even negative excess compensation on high risk 
issues. This could produce the negative relation between excess 
compensation and issue riskiness reported above. To address this possibility, 
we eliminated from the sample all IPOs which had theoretical compensation 
(put value using one day maturity) greater than 2.8%. Since the underwriting 
portion of actual compensation averages about 22% of total compensation 
for our sample, this eliminates IPOs from the sample which have theoretical 
compensation of 14% or more. Accordingly, this eliminates all IPOs for 
which the NASD regulation should be operative hence, eliminates the 
possibility of low or negative excess compensation due to NASD regulations. 
We reestimated Regressions 3 and 4 (not shown) with the new sample and 
found no differences in the regression results. This suggests NASD 
regulations are not responsible for the negative relation between excess 
compensation and return variance.
It appears that underwriters behave in a way that is consistent with the 
observed negative relationship between excess underwriting profits and IPO 
return variance — the results are not due to measurement error or NASD 
regulations. Another possible explanation we consider for this finding is that 
underwriters underprice high risk issues more than low risk issues. By 
underpricing, underwriters ensure these issues sell out quickly diereby 
minimizing marketing costs and mitigating the underwriting risk proxied by 
return variance. In effect, realized excess compensation for high variance stocks 
would be systematically greater than the excess compensation we estimate here. 
The underpricing literature is consistent with this explanation: it suggests high 
risk IPOs are underpriced more than low risk IPOs (see Ritter [20] and Bae 
and Levy [2]). To examine this possibility we included first day return as an 
independent variable in Regressions 3 and 4 (not shown). The coefficient on 
first day return was negative, as expected, but not significant (t=0.2) in either 
case. While these results are consistent with the underpricing explanation, they 
provide only weak evidence for the hypothesis.
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Finally, we omit VAR(i) since it appears as an independent variable and 
also affects our dependent variable. Regressions 5 and 6, as seen in Table
3, replicate Regressions 3 and 4, respectively, but VAR(?) is omitted as an 
independent variable. Thus, Regression 5 has as its dependent variable excess 
compensation generated using total underwriter compensation as the actual 
underwriting risk premium, while Regression 6 uses excess compensation 
as based on the underwriting activity of the gross spread. When variance was 
omitted we continued to obtain significant F statistics and the signs on the 
coefficients were generally not affected.
V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Using the Black-Scholes OPM, and as based on a covered call position 
established by the underwriter in the dealings with the issuer and investors, 
put values were estimated and compared to underwriter compensation for 
a sample of 209 firm commitment IPOs. If the gross spread is viewed as 
compensation for the underwriting function (i.e., no underwriting expenses 
exist), positive excess compensation occurs for all option maturities. 
However, assuming that underwriting expenses do occur for underwriters, 
and when that part of underwriter compensation designated for marketing, 
origination and management is excluded, excess compensation is positive 
for issues that sell out quickly and negative for issues that sell out more 
slowly. On average, it appears that IPO shares sold to investors in less than 
three days provide undenvriters positive excess compensation for their 
underwriting services. IPO shares that sell in more than three days produce 
negative excess compensation. Since most firm commitment IPOs sell out 
quickly, most issues provide positive excess compensation to investment 
bankers. This positive excess compensation may represent quasi-rent 
collected by underwriters for the use of their “reputation”. However, a few 
slow moving issues will increase average maturity substantially and decrease 
excess compensation. In addition, our findings are consistent with the 
underpricing literature: underpricing provides investment bankers a means 
of disposing of IPO shares quickly and avoiding economic losses from 
underwriting activity.
The results also show the amount of excess compensation earned by 
underwriters is negatively related to the size of the IPO, the degree of 
competition among underwriters, and the riskiness of the issue. These results 
are similar to those obtained for new issues of seasoned common stock and 
suggest that underwriters earn less excess compensation as issue size, riskiness 
and underwriter competition increase. The negative relation between excess
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compensation and IPO variance is consistent with the underpricing 
literature, although our results are somewhat inconclusive. It does seem clear, 
however, the negative relation between excess compensation and IPO return 
variance is not due to either measurement error in the variance estimates or 
NASD regulations limiting total underwriter compensation to 14% or less.
A useful extension to this work would be the determination of the actual 
time required to sell issues in the IPO market. This would provide direct 
empirical evidence on the degree of efficiency in the market for underwriting 
services among investment bankers in firm commitment offerings.
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NOTES
1. Kunimura and lihara [12] also found positive mean excess compensation earned by 
underwriters in Japan and the United Kingdom.
2. Whether underwriters realize any excess compensation on a particular issue depends 
upon how long, ex post, the issue takes to sell out. Our concern in this paper is not 
on whether excess compensation is realized but instead on how underwriter services are 
priced in the IPO market. We do, however, address below the liklihood of underwriters 
realizing excess compensation in the IPO market.
3. See, for example, Merton [16].
4. Section #9 of a typical Master Agreement Among Underwriters states, “...this Agreement 
shall terminate 30 days after the initial public offering date of the Securities....” During 
this 30 day period underwriters are legally bound to “...the performance of the 
Underwriter Agreement...” Similarly, during this period the lead underwriter(s) 
maintain the right to “...postpone the closing date...; ...exercise any right of 
cancellation...; determine the initial public offering price...; ...make changes in the terms 
of the offering....”
5. The variance measure utilized does not include the first day return (i.e., offer price vs. 
first day closing price). However, the closing price of the first trading day is used to 
help measure the second trading day’s return. Thus, 29 daily returns are used to measure 
return variance. Since the first day’s closing price may reflect activities performed by 
the underwriter to stabilize the market for the stock, daily return variance was also 
measured excluding the first day altogether. That is, 28 days of returns were used to 
measure return variance. This second measure resulted in a sample annualized return 
variance that was 1.5% lower relative to the variance measure that included the first day’s 
closing price. Overall, excess compensation results were not significantly different using 
this second measure of return variance relative to using the first. Consequendy, only 
results utilizing the first measure of return variance (i.e., 29 days of returns) are reported 
here.
6. Regulation A of the Securities Act provides for exemption from detailed registration 
(with the SEC) of any issue with an initial market value of less than $1,500,000 ($300,000 
prior to 1978).
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7. Firms for which the initial offering of stock was preceeded by a public offering of debt 
securities were not considered IPOs. This characterization parallels Booth and Smith
[5].
8. See Ritter [20].
9. Barry, Muscarella and Vetsuypens [3] provide evidence that warrant provisions, when 
present, are between 45-80% of the underwriter spread in firm commitment IPOs, 
depending on the valuation model used. They found that warrants tend to be used more 
in high-risk offerings and may represent a way to circumvent regulatory compensation 
limits as well as a means to address information asymmetry between issuing companies 
and investors. Since these warrants are typically not exercisable for at least one year 
following the offer, the actual compensation to underwriters possessing these warrants 
is uncertain and, therefore, not considered in this study.
10. The difference between price per share offered to investors and the price per share paid 
to the issuing firm divided by the price per share offered to investors is used to measure 
underwriter compensation in percent terms. This is typical in the IPO literature—see 
Marsh [14].
11. The 1987 data includes an offering in excess of $1 billion by Consolidated Rail, formerly 
Penn Central Corporation. Excluding this IPO had no impact on the results reported 
below hence we continue to include it in the sample.
12. Technically, excess compensation could also occur because the Black/Scholes Option 
Pricing Model is inappropriate for modeling underwriter compensation in firm 
commitment IPOs or because the model itself is misspecified. Smith [23] discusses the 
appropriateness of the model in this context and Rubinstein [22] compares the Black/ 
Scholes formulation of the option pricing model against alternative specifications.
13. A second set of estimated option values was calculated using the closing price on the 
first trading day as the proxy for the market price of the stock. In the case of OTC stocks, 
the closing ask price was used as the market price. The use of the first day closing price 
as a proxy for the market price is based on the assumption that it represents, in an efficient 
market sense, the equilibrium price of the stock on the offer day. Given the relative 
amount of underpricing associated with this sample, in particular, and IPOs in general, 
one would expect that excess compensation would increase since the estimated put 
valuation would reflect an option that is now out-of-the-money. Such is the result here 
as the excess compensation for underwriting services only is —2.02%, —0.08% and 0.92% 
for 30 day, 8 day, and 1 day option maturities, respectively. The excess compensation 
result for the 8 day option maturity is not significantly different from 0 at the 0.05 level 
of significance. This result indicates that underwriters earn excess compensation as long 
as the issue sells out in less than 8 days. Thus, it may provide an upper bound time 
limit as to when the underwriter must fully distribute the shares or suffer losses for the 
underwriting activities. Nevertheless, the result provides empirical evidence supporting 
the underpricing results seen in so many studies.
14. Bae and Levy [2] provide an estimate of the cost of holding inventory and the cost to 
the underwriter for having to pay the issuing company while still waiting for payment 
from the investor. They estimate this cost, given a 10% broker call rate and a 10 day 
lag time in receiving funds from investors, to be P(0.137%) +  (1- P)(2*0.137%) where P 
represents the probability of a successful issue.
15. Two other variables have been used as proxies for issuing company risk, the number 
of years the company has been incorporated (AGE(O) and the dollar size of the company’s 
assets (ASSET(i)). The notion is that the older the company and the larger its asset base, 
the less risky the company. However, ISS(i) and ASSET(i) are highly, positively
On Excess Compensation
correlated and AGE(i) has not been found to be consistently related to underwriter 
compensation. Although not shown here, regressions 1 and 2 were performed with 
AGE(i) and the natural log of ASSET(i) in place of VAR(i). Only the coefficient for 
ASSET(i) was found to have any significance, although it lowered the explanatory power 
of ISS(i). The coefficient for AGE(«) was not significantly different from zero. Overall, 
the explanatory power of each regression was no greater than the regressions involving 
VAR(0
16. See Marsh [14] for an extended discussion.
17. The Bayesian adjusted variance estimate for security i, AdjVar(i), is shown below: 
AdjV a,« =  YE(S)m + YE(51(S2
E(i)+E(S) EB+E(S)
where,
Var(i) =  the variance estimate for security i;
E(i) = the variance of the estimate of Var(i)=Var(i)/2n;
n = the number of return observations used to estimate Var(2);
E(S) =  the cross-sectional sample variance of Var(i) estimates;
Var(S) =  the cross-sectional sample mean of Var(i) estimates.
18. NASD Notice to Members 83-15 dated April 8, 1983 specifies guidelines for firm 
commitment IPOs, secondary offerings and best efforts offerings.
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